brown dog

My google-fu isn't working well: Who in UK stocks and sells Klinsky stocks? (Quite taken with the AW-style laminate for cz452)

Great and balanced post. Thanks 😊 Always good to read technical and expert rifle/equipment focussed varminting chat, which I sense was the intent of the OP. The 'other stuff' always attracts trouble and trouble-types, which is why we don't have it on here. Simples.

Blinkingly, re-read this paragraph a couple of times... can't get my head around a 'single base' powder with both NC and NG. I need more coffee.

😂😂👍

My tuppence: A lot of the pro 6.5 commentary stresses shot placement. If we're discussing large-body deer, I personally believe that bigger bullets are more forgiving when shot placement is sub- optimal. It's rather akin to the argument about whether 243 is a beginner's deer calibre. Some say it is, but many have come to see 243 as an expert's calibre - beginners needing something with more knock down in the event of sub optimal placement. Will a 6.5 kill large deer? Undoubtedly, but with the right 'shot placement' 22lr will kill moose, but that doesn't make 22 a great choice. I think 'knock down is part of this conversation, and that part of the conversation includes momentum (rather than KE) and energy transfer rates. As we all know, it starts to wander into subjectivity as much as science, but the '308 for boar' comments probably reflect the truism of the knock down difference between 308 and 6.5. I forget who said it, someone like O'Connor, but when questioned on smaller calibres he said 'not if it's for something that wants to chew on my blue jeans'. So... I don't think it's correct to say there's no difference on the animal. There definitely is.

I've nothing to add to that publicly 😂

😂 wish I hadn't been !!

In terms of planning, I think the critical thing missed nationally has been the timing of decision points. I'm lucky enough, a million years ago, to have done a biological sciences degree which included a wee bit of microbiology and study of disease, so our trajectory was obvious to me once Italy was 'breached'. I was horrified by the muppetry coming out of Boris and Witty at this point, laissez faire rubbish - to the point that I'd question Witty's judgement - and made my own calls. I was predicting April peak back when Witty et al were talking sh1te about herd immunity and July peaks. It led to some good-humoured lively discussions at work, most were stuck in 'it's just Johnny foreigner- those emotional eyties and dagoes- it won't be like that here, we're British' , even when I was showing them data (which I was tracking) that we were accelerating faster than Italy. (Sadly, all have since had to eat humble pie as my read-out came to pass). Other DPs were there to read, if looking. I gave pals a heads-up that panic buying was 'just around the corner' on 3 March. Some listened; others stuck with muttering about eyties and 'it's just flu'. Gosh, what a rant... bottom line: Planning isn't just about the plan, it's about anticipating required decisions, and making them at the right time.

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A couple of weeks ago, sensing the certainty of a lockdown; I decided to nip out to see if I could pick up a s/h BRNO for a spare slot on my chit. Unbelievably, I walked into my local shop and immediately spotted a BRNO for £120, complete with SAK and scope... a 30 second shufti at crown and bore, and I bought it with no further thought. The rifle's aesthetic is a delight Haven't had much chance to play with it yet, but it seems incredible so far (I swapped a better scope onto it than the 4x40 job it came with). First tgt pic is zeroing at 22m a couple of days ago (the tgt dot's fallen off) first 3 shots bottom right (including a first-round cracker), then bold adjustment and another 3, then another adjustment and another 3. The top two holes are 3 rds each! Then yesterday, off a footstool (!😂) at 40m. 2 x 3rd group (with a scope adjustment between the 2!) All groups with SK standard - the limiting factor is me! Best 120 quid I've spent in a long time!! and, as a fun distraction, it's making me smile😊😊

Winchesterlord1 is their newest nom de plume. Still active, but now blocked on here.

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Looks great 👍

Thanks!👍😊

On here? How did he reach you? His account (annexgun on here) is frozen - is there another account being used?

Don't know any of the involved parties but, as an onlooker, the intrigue and mis-matched narratives remind me of the acrimony at the time of the Sweetlamb Orion/WMS 'change of hands'.

What a relief to see that that money I cabled to Nigeria helped Baros get to UK

Doyou think you may be confusing the role of forum administrators with the role executed by the police? Similarly, if you wish to raise the issue to paypal, the prudent route may be to actually contact paypal. Just an idea.🤔

Sorry gazzar - deleted my response! 😂 (I'd said that that's not written by someone whose first language is english )

Gary, can this rifle be reset to FAC (which I have!)?

Pops, it was a server issue:

Yup, and the delta between most tgt ammo and most 'hv' is rarely more than 100fps ... not really empirically observable at the tgt. Of course the reason tgt ammo is a gnat's nadger under the speed of sound is to avoid disturbance during 'transition' (which I'd guess most hv is doing in the first 50 or 100m - but would be easy to calculate) in order to be more accurate.

Not got my FAC to hand, but I stepped around the issue by asking to have 'and practice' (rather than 'target shooting') added after 'zeroing'.

THE DERRYARD ACTION 13 DECEMBER 1989 On 13 December 1989 PVCP Derryard, North of Rosslea, 2KM from the Fermanagh- Monaghan border was manned by 2 teams from SP Coy 1 KOSB. The Commander was Cpl RB Duncan, the 2ic was LCpl MJ Paterson and the other members of the teams were Ptes CG Gray, H Harvey, J Houston, D Landsdell, J Sloan and KP Whitelaw. That day as a result of an unspecific threat to all border locations the PVCP had been reinforced by an additional SP Coy team Commanded by Cpl IB Harvey with Ptes SR Dunn, W Common and WRG Maxwell as team members. As normal the PVCP was operated by 4 men: Cpl Duncan in the Command Sangar, Pte Whitelaw in the rear observation Sangar, Pte Houston the roadman checking vehicles and Pte Harvey as runner. A visitor, SSgt SM Bradley RE a NISS SNCO was in the Command Sangar carrying out maintenance work. LCpl Paterson and his team were off duty and asleep in one of the 3 small portakabins. Cpl Harvey’s team were on an external security patrol. At 1620hrs PIRA attacked the checkpoint in considerable force. It is clear that the enemy had good knowledge of the layout, manning levels and routine of the PVCP, undoubtedly built up over many months of reconnaissance. For the terrorist it was a “soft target” being tactically indefensible, poorly protected and manned with the minimum of weaponry. PIRA brought with them the manpower, weapons, vehicles and explosive devices to destroy the base, which was their intent. They had not counted on the fighting spirit, training and natural aggression of the Jocks and did not know Cpl Harvey’s team were in the area of the base. The enemy failed in their mission. At least 12 terrorists were concealed under a tarpaulin in the back of a Hino flatbed lorry. The sides of the lorry had been built up and protected with spaced compressed sand. A crash bar had been fitted, as had mountings for 2 machine guns and external armour plates. A second vehicle, an Isuzu van contained a 240kg bomb. The terrorists were armed with 6 RPG 7 rockets, a flamethrower, 6 Armalite and AK47 rifles, 2 MGs and several fragmentation grenades. The lorry approached from the direction of the border and stopped in the PVCP road area. It was seen and reported by Pte Whitelaw and Cpl Harvey’s team who were on the high ground 500m to the North. Cpl Duncan instructed Pte Houston to check the back of the vehicle. The lorry sounded its horn, at which Pte Whitelaw who was observing his other arc turned around to see the enemy attack launched. Simultaneous automatic gunfire killed Pte Houston, suppressed the Command and observation sangars and sprayed the thinly protected walls of the base, grenades were thrown into the base. Flame was fired at the Command sangar. Two RPG 7s were fired at the observation sangar, both hit and the sangar was destroyed. Heavy suppressive fire continued as the lorry was reversed and smashed its way through the gates into the compound and was then driven out of the base. The Isuzu van was driven in and the bomb primed. At least 3 terrorists dismounted with flame, gunfire and grenades, systematically set about clearing the portakabin. As the enemy attack started Cpl Duncan immediately returned fire from the Command sangar. He continued to do so until forced to withdraw under the weight of fire and flame that was splintering the sangar walls and penetrating inside the sangar through the observation ports. He ordered SSgt Bradley to move under cover to the rear of the base. Pte Whitelaw was thrown to the ground inside the observation sangar as the structure broke apart and the upper floor collapsed. He suffered minor blast burns from the exploding rockets. As he recovered his senses, he saw an unexploded grenade at his feet. He kicked it away. The grenade exploded harmlessly. A second grenade exploded causing him multiple minor fragmentation injuries in his side and back. As the enemy sprayed the base with gunfire and grenades and smashed the lorry into the compound, Cpl Duncan, still firing, crossed through the fire to check all the portakabins and to order his men to re-group behind cover at the rear of the base. He checked the observation sangar but Pte Whitelaw was not there. He moved to the rear gate. Inside the kitchen portakabin Pte Harvey was pinned down. Inside the accommodation portakabin LCpl Paterson and his team awoke as the attack started. He ordered the men to put on their helmets and flak jackets, grab their weapons and stay under cover. LCpl Paterson left by the rear door. He moved to the observation sangar where he found SSgt Bradley helping the injured Pte Whitelaw. The 2 NCOs moved him back into the accommodation. LCpl Paterson left the accommodation again and moved round into the compound where he was killed by gunfire. By this time Cpl Duncan was fighting his way to the observation sangar and back to the rear gate. Finding no one there, he moved into the compound to discover the body of LCpl Paterson. The terrorists had just withdrawn, still firing automatic weapons and another RPG 7 at the base. He ordered his soldiers to give first aid, check for casualties and get to the radio in the Command sangar. He moved to the front of the base to check for Pte Houston. Following the sighting of the Hino lorry Cpl Harvey and his team were moving down towards the PVCP from the North when the attack began. Cpl Harvey’s contact report at this time was critical. It was the only message received by Battalion HQ until after the action. It allowed the essential re-deployment of reserves and follow-up agencies. The team rapidly made their way to the PVCP, halting on the road some 75-100m to the North. The rear of the lorry was visible outside the base. The terrorists were clearly identified firing into the compound. Cpl Harvey and his men opened fire hitting the rear of the lorry five times. The enemy immediately switched the bulk of their fire onto the patrol forcing them to dive for cover into the hedgerows to the West of the road. By skilful fire and manoeuvre, the patrol worked its way to a position adjacent to the PVCP, continuing to draw heavy enemy fire and forcing the enemy to withdraw. The lorry was found abandoned at the border with a210kg bomb on board. Cpl Harvey and his men came onto the road just as the lorry was disappearing and as Cpl Duncan was trying to revive Pte Houston. The 2 Corporals, recognising that the Isuzu van was a bomb, evacuated the base and established the cordon. As the booster charge of the bomb exploded the first helicopter arrived bringing in reserves. The casualties were rapidly evacuated and the follow-up began. This was a terrifying close quarter action which lasted some 10 minutes. It was a fight for existence. As PIRA declared subsequently they were intent on “totally destroying the enemy position”. Every man involved acted with exemplary courage and determination to defeat the enemy. The conduct of Cpl Duncan and Cpl Harvey and of LCpl Paterson was in the highest traditions of conspicuous gallantry. By their actions they saved the PVCP. By their actions they fought back at the enemy, fought to regain some initiative, and finally fought off the attack forcing the terrorists to withdraw prematurely and ensuring their failure. As PIRA also stated “the soldiers, despite several demands to surrender, refused to comply…ore ASU was forced to withdraw… (hastened by the presence of)…a sizeable British Army foot patrol”. LCpl Paterson and Pte Houston died as true soldiers; they died fighting as men, in action, carrying out their duties.